John Francis Lee wrote:
> On Tue, 2007-10-23 at 17:03 -0700, Martin Fick wrote:
>> Is there perhaps a large security benefit from running
>> separate tor server and the tor client instances in
>> separate vservers? I.E. If someone breaks into your
>> tor server vserver, they will still not be able to see
>> your local unencrypted tor traffic since it will enter
>> the other (client tor) vserver which does not have any
>> listening ports exposed to the internet?
> I seem to remember some discussion of someone in Europe running multiple
> tor instances on a single machine using virtual servers of some sort and
> of that's destroying the intended anonymity of the tor's themselves. In
> fact the implication was that the multiple tor instances were
> purposefully run as a honeypot by some institution which did not like
> the idea of an anonymous internet.
Martins situation (one tor server instance, one (or more) client
instance(s)) isn't a problem. Running multiple server instances can be,
if the tor network doesn't know that they are related.
Your tor client builds virtual circuits through three nodes that are
chosen from the pool of available nodes (about 1100 now).
If all three are controlled by the same person, you're in trouble. If he
controls the first (entry node) and the last (exit node), you probably
are in trouble too.
Received on Wed Oct 24 14:40:46 2007