hey guys (and maybe even women),
just to inform you... i've created the 2.6.36 patch with the latest
grsec and linux-vserver patch. Also put up a new 2.6.23.25 patch.
I put it online on the website
for those interested in what my work is/was in these kernels: i put a
patch online of the changes i made to the "combination of both patches"
http://harry.enzoverder.be/mypatch-2.6.32.22
http://harry.enzoverder.be/mypatch-2.6.36
this "fixes" everything that goes wrong when you apply grsec and then
linux-vserver patches to a vanilla kernel...
Let me know if it's useful. The refcount fixes are there too of
course :)
if you need more info or so, don't hesitate to ask!
KR,
Rik Bobbaers
-- http://harry.enzoverder.be On Tue, 2010-11-09 at 10:52 -0600, Michael S. Zick wrote: > On Tue November 9 2010, Kyle Bader wrote: > > Hey Ed, > > > > > I'm assuming that you are one of the pax team? I know it's already quite a > > > maintenance effort, but would the grsec/pax folks be amenable to maintaining > > > a more "partial" patch which would merge with the vserver stuff more easily? > > > > I'm not on the PaX/grsecurity team, I just make heavy use of their > > patchset and have used it in conjunction with several other kernel > > patches (vserver and aufs mostly). As such please don't take my words > > as authoritative on the subject, a clued in user is still a far cry > > from the project developer :) > > > > > It appears that this is the section I need to get a skills transfer from Rik > > > on... I'm about to go away on a pretty serious work trip for 2 weeks, so > > > would appreciate any help from anyone in the meantime? > > > > Kees Cook has recently started a movement to get some of the features > > of grsecurity into mainline, you can read more about it here: > > > > https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/Roadmap/KernelHardening#Upstream%20Hardening > > > > I think that putting effort here would be a better contribution to the > > Linux ecosystem because it would help everyone, including people who > > use linux-vserver. This effort is also likely to generate more > > eyeballs for review and when it comes to security, that's a good thing > > :D > > > > Although that link mentions /proc 'leaks' - > I think that "lsof" used in a guest context is probably exposing > more than the operator of the host should be comforable with. > > Add my +1 cent to Kyle's +2 cents. > > Mike > > Keep in mind that in light of this work there are still things that > > would need to be done to the vserver patch, I can think of two: > > > > 1. Make reference counters unchecked where applicable > > 2. Constify function pointers wherever possible > > > > #1 is only relevant for the refcount protection and #2 isn't strictly > > required for vserver/pax interoperability but it's in the spirit of > > the work PaX has been doing: > > > > http://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/pax-future.txt > > > > Just my $0.02 > > > >Received on Wed Nov 10 00:33:00 2010